Could God Exist?

Jesko Veenema

Could God Exist? Conflicting Attributes of God

An investigation in the philosophy of religion

[This is a translation by the author of his German essay Könnte Gott existieren?, written in February 2023.]

“He who defines God is already an atheist.”

Oswald Spengler, Thoughts, Of Religion (quoted by Puntsch 1995: 18).

1 Introduction

More than once in the history of philosophy, attempts have been made to derive the existence of God from the concept of God itself, according to which the existence of God may be assumed under all circumstances, since it is a priori certain.[1]  Far less often has the opposite been attempted: to point to self-contradictions in the concept of God, from which one would be forced to conclude a priori that God does not exist.

In the present study, self-contradictory aspects of the concept of God are examined and it is investigated whether God’s existence is impossible a priori. In doing so, religious specifics are deliberately omitted: dogmas of particular religions, denominations or schools are not of interest here;[2] rather, the concept of God is approached in as pure a form as possible. It is explicitly not a religious or theological, but a philosophical investigation; the preceding quotation is also to be understood in this sense. Nevertheless, the religious roots of the philosophical concept of God cannot and should not be denied; therefore, religious and theological sources and ideas are used.

Consider the importance of the question at hand: If the attributes attributed to God contradict each other in such a way that no meaningful concept of God is possible, then the statement ‘There is no God’ – atheism – is tautological. All arguments for the existence of God, on the other hand, would be null and void and the philosophical debate around it would be decided in favour of atheism.

Before the final conclusion, a brief reflection is inserted on how it would be possible to hold a self-contradictory concept of God at all.

2 Atheism and Agnosticism

Among the well-known public representatives of atheism, the paradoxes associated with the concept of God are conspicuously seldom pointed out; instead, reference is often made to scientific explanations that can dispense with God, belief in God is explained and the scientific principle of parsimony (Ockham’s knife) is insisted upon. The existence of God is not ruled out by these arguments; only the usual proofs of God are refuted.

This does not make it impossible, but merely highly improbable, as most of these atheists themselves admit; for example, the evolutionary biologist and critic of religion Richard Dawkins writes in his popular pamphlet The God Delusion:

That one cannot prove God’s non-existence is a generally accepted, trivial insight, even if only in the sense that one can never absolutely prove the non-existence of anything. What matters is not whether God’s existence is disprovable (it is not), but whether it is probable. (Dawkins 2018: 77 f.)

Dawkins refers in the same chapter to Bertrand Russell’s famous parable of the teapot orbiting the sun between Earth and Mars; according to this analogy, an atheist does not have to justify his position any more than someone who does not believe in such a teapot (ibid.: 74 f.).

Absurd as it may be, the existence of such a teapot can be thought of clearly and without contradiction, which is why, as Dawkins rightly points out, people “[s]trictly speaking [...] would all have to call themselves teapot agnostics: We cannot prove with certainty that there is no heavenly teapot.” (Ibid: 75)

With the refutation discussed in the following chapters, atheism in its strictest and most blatant sense may be possible: not merely a disbelief regarding God’s existence, but actually a belief in his non-existence. For if the conjecture presented in section 1 is true, God’s existence is not even clearly and incontrovertibly conceivable – and would thus fall even below the status of the heavenly teapot.

Agnosticism – the view that one cannot (philosophically) answer the question of the existence of God – would thus also be refuted.

3 The Reverse Ontological Argument

Ontological arguments aim to prove the existence of God from the concept itself; this work attempts to prove his non-existence from the concept itself. Nevertheless, the refutation presented in this work is not simply a reversal of the ontological argument as we find it in Anselm of Canterbury or René Descartes (cf. Brugger 1992: 278). An example of such a reversal has been provided by the Australian Douglas Gasking:

1. The creation of the world is the greatest imaginable achievement.

2. The value of an achievement is the product of (a) its intrinsic quality and (b) the capabilities of its creator.

3. The greater the inability (or disability) of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.

4. The greatest impediment to a creator would be that he does not exist.

5. So if we assume that the universe is the product of an existing creator, we can imagine an even greater being, one who created everything even though he does not exist.

6. An existing God would therefore not be so great that we could not imagine something even greater, because a much more powerful and incredible creator would be a God who does not exist.

7. God does not exist (quoted by Dawkins 2018: 117).

This argument is, of course, as invalid as all ontological arguments, since existence is “obviously not a real predicate, i.e. a concept of anything that can be added to the concept of a thing” (Kant 1975: 633). The inverted proof presented in this paper is therefore not based on the fact that non-existence is inherent in the concept of God as a predicate, but on the fact that its individual predicates contradict each other. This is a subtle, but very important difference.

So, though it certainly would make a good eye-catcher, I would not call my approach an ‘ontological refutation of God’ or the like; it might be confusing.

4 Contradictions in the Concept of God

In the following, the contradictions that emerge within the concept of God will be discussed in detail. These cannot always be sharply separated from each other and are interrelated.

The literature on this topic is sparse and remains implicit. David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), in which the fictional discussants each represent different aspects of the concept of God, served as the main source.

4.1 Personhood

The Bible says: “And God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him” (Genesis 1: 27, here and in the following according to Württembergische Bibelanstalt Stuttgart 1978). In contrast to all other earthly living beings, man is therefore similar to God or God to man. God is therefore personal.

The history of monotheism is a history of spiritualisation. In early Judaism, God could still walk very physically through the Garden of Eden and had many human features. In the New Testament, on the other hand, the spirituality of God is emphasised: “God is spirit” (John 4: 24). Thus, he distances himself from man, who always remains corporeal. This is an increased worship: God loses more and more all-too-human attributes and thus becomes more and more perfect. Demea, Hume’s fictional representative of Christian orthodoxy, quotes the French cleric and philosopher Nicolas Malebranche as follows:

[I]n the same manner as we ought not to imagine, even supposing him corporeal, that he is clothed with a human body [...]; so, neither ought we to imagine that the spirit of God has human ideas, or bears any resemblance to our spirit [...]. We ought rather to believe that as he comprehends the perfections of matter without being material.... [Hume’s omission] he comprehends also the perfections of created spirit without being spirit, in the manner we conceive spirit [...] (Hume 2009: 22; pt. 2).[3]

In another passage, Demea describes the human soul as a chaotic, unsteady, and inconsistent collection of faculties, drives, experiences and ideas; in contrast, God is uniform, simple and unchanging (cf. ibid.: 39 f.; pt. 4).

But this ‘dehumanisation’ of God obviously has natural limits. Personhood cannot be expelled from the concept of God, although this has been attempted in philosophy. The most important representative of such a distorted concept of God is Baruch de Spinoza. God is regarded by him as all-encompassing and mysterious, thereby forfeiting any personal character: “By God I understand the par excellence of infinite being, i.e. the substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite being.” (Cited by Lutz 1989: 750) The completely impersonal word “substance” (substantia) is particularly striking. Spinoza sums up his doctrine of pantheism as follows: “All that is is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.” (Cited ibid.)

It is obvious that this concept of God is opposed to any true theist understanding. Thus, an encyclopaedia of Catholic dogmatics states: “In some pantheistic views of modern times, God is denied personhood because it can only be related to contingent behaviour. In this way, however, the divine would be degraded to a dull and blind dynamic and ultimately denied altogether”. (Beinert 1987: 414) The philosopher of religion Johannes Hirschberger says: “Thus the theologians destroy God when they make him into the ‘very other’ in an over-glorification [!]” (Hirschberger 2010: 212) And a handbook of religious studies states:

[F]or any unreflective piety, the P[ersonality] of G[ott] is self-evident, so much so that it is not first particularly asserted. Neither in the Bible nor in the holy scriptures of other religions is it emphasised; it is the unquestionable prerequisite for every statement about God, for every activity of piety, prayer, devotion, thanksgiving, repentance. […] If, as seems necessary, the concept of the absolute is applied to God, the assertion of his personality seems to become impossible. [...] P[ersonality] is not all-embracing, is not absolute, and is therefore not applicable to God. Philosophy will therefore have the tendency to reject the personality of God from the concept of the absolute. [...] Thus it is a justified task to think of [it] as all-embracing, even if its solution can never succeed completely, because God is always greater than all human concepts [!]. In any case, faith can never understand God other than as an unconditional subject, and therefore the personality of God is already included. It also follows from the religious relationship, which is personal by its very nature. (Bertholet et al. 1927-1932: 4th vol., 1091)

A pantheism of Spinoza’s kind is ultimately indistinguishable from atheism.  Thus, it is legitimate when, for example, the British philosopher John Gray calls Spinoza an atheist (cf. Gray 2019: 147). Arthur Schopenhauer already thinks that the “sole substance, the world,” actually supersedes God in Spinoza: “The name [God] thus clings […] at the place where that which has been there before left it and that which enters instead finds it. [...] In general, pantheism is only a polite atheism.” (Schopenhauer 1892: 61, § 58)

At the same time, monotheism apparently cannot remain with a simple, personal God. The unconditional and necessary character of his existence makes any contingent personality implausible. Monotheism therefore finds itself in a constant field of tension between personal and abstract concepts of God.

4.2 Understandability (in Itself)

Demea says in Hume’s Dialogues:

The question is not concerning the being, but the nature of God. This, I affirm, from the infirmities of human understanding, to be altogether incomprehensible and unknown to us. The essence of that supreme Mind, his attributes, the manner of his existence, the very nature of his duration; these, and every particular which regards so divine a Being, are mysterious to men. [...] They are covered in a deep cloud from human curiosity. (Hume 2009: 21; pt. 2)

God’s essence is not recognisable to man. Man must practise humility in the face of the divine mystery. According to Anselm of Canterbury: “Man rationally comprehends that God is incomprehensible.” (Beinert 1987: 129)

This orthodox view is interestingly cited especially in connection with the problem of evil, probably to avoid it. Well known are the verses from Isaiah 55: 8, 9: “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the LORD [Yahweh]: but as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts.”

At the same time, it is indispensable for faith in God to be intelligible. Hans Jonas writes from the standpoint of Judaism:

Our teaching, the Torah, is based on and insists that we can understand God, not completely of course, but something of him – of his will, his intentions, and even of his nature, for he has made it known to us. There has been revelation, we possess his commandments and his law, and to some – his prophets – he has communicated himself directly [...] (Jonas 1987: 38 f.).

This can also be said for all major religions. Although theistic philosophers do not have to believe in a revelation, they basically have to assume that God is understandable all the more if they assume a rational knowledge of God.

Total mysticism with regard to the divine nature ultimately tends to collapse into practical atheism. And so, in Hume, Demea’s interlocutor Cleanthes asks him: “[H]ow do you mystics, who maintain the absolute incomprehensibility of the Deity, differ from Sceptics or Atheists, who assert, that the first cause of all is unknown and unintelligible?” (Hume 2009: 39; pt. 4)

The contradiction of divine comprehensibility is clearly shown by Nicolaus of Cusa in his De visione Dei (1453): 

The highest knowledge is not to be regarded as inaccessible in the sense that all access to it is barred to us, nor may we ever think that it has been reached and truly grasped; rather, it is to be thought of in such a way that we can constantly approach it, while it nevertheless remains permanently inaccessible in its absolute essence. (Cited by Lutz 1989: 574)

The contradiction becomes almost explicit here. It is not as polar as in other cases since total comprehensibility is by no means part of the concept of God. Nevertheless, partial comprehensibility and total incomprehensibility compete.

4.3 Recognizability (in Nature)

Within Christianity, the status of a natural theology that draws its knowledge of God from nature is disputed. The natural theologian and his orthodox opponent are excellently represented in Hume’s Dialogues by the characters Cleanthes and Demea. Cleanthes is of the opinion that God is known through nature:

The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is some-what similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties. (Hume 2009: 23; pt. 2)[4]

One can already see the connection to personhood here (see chapter 4.1), but that is not the point. Cleanthes is of the opinion that God is recognisable in nature: the nature of God may be inferred from nature. This is vehemently contradicted by his opponent Demea; in his view, God can be proven a priori by reason (cf. ibid.: 69 f.; pt. 9); furthermore, man intuitively feels the presence of God when he becomes aware of the stupidity and misery of his existence (cf. ibid.: 74; pt. 10).

This is the exact opposite of the justification of deism of, say, a Voltaire:

I am surprised that among so many surpassing proofs of the existence of God, one has not yet fallen to invoking pleasure as a proof; pleasure is something divine, and I am of the opinion that anyone who drinks good Tokay, who kisses a beautiful woman, in a word, who has pleasant sensations, must acknowledge a beneficent supreme being. (Cited by Weischedel 1980: 187)

Voltaire (like Cleanthes, cf. Hume 2009: 44, 82; pts. 4, 10) turns to God out of gratitude for creation; Demea, on the other hand, precisely to turn away from that creation. From his point of view, it is imperfect in many respects, whereas God is perfect. This was contradicted, for example, by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, because in his eyes every error of creation would have been an error of God; therefore, he had to assume that the present world was the best possible world (cf. Lutz 1989: 449 f.).

There is thus great ambiguity about the relationship to God and the world, for Demea is also convinced that God is the cause of the world (cf. again Hume 2009: 69; pt. 9). Although the different religions and denominations each accentuate the recognisability or unrecognisability of God in nature differently, this contradiction is not yet resolved. A God who has nothing to do with nature seems just as absurd as one who can be recognised in it; or both are equally obvious.

As with understandability (see chapter 4.2), a position is taken depending on the circumstances. In the face of a particularly beautiful landscape, for example, one praises the divinity of nature (cf. Psalm 104: 24); in the face of horror, one describes the world as void (before God), degrading it to a mere precursor to eternal life. A consistent overall picture does not emerge.

4.4 Involvement

“For God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life.” (John 3:16) This central verse of the Bible emphasises God’s involvement in worldly and especially human events. Accordingly, God cares for people and rejoices over every individual who turns from the path of sin. Yet it does not always have to be a loving God who is emotionally involved (this is a Christian speciality): “[...] For I, the LORD [Yahweh] your God, am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation [...]” (Deut. 5: 9). In any case, God is in the midst of world events.

At the same time, the image of God includes sublimity. God stands, metaphorically speaking, above things and, although he sees the creature in the world suffering, he looks down on it from a higher vantage point and does not suffer the same sufferings. This would also be a sign of imperfection and worldliness.

But it is nevertheless the case that God is drawn into worldly affairs through his compassion. Thus, a contradiction arises between a close, interested, involved God, who is also limited in his greatness, on the one hand and a distant, superior, external God on the other. Friedrich Nietzsche writes polemically: “So the devil once said to me: ‘God also has his hell: that is his love for men’. And lately I heard him say this word: ‘God is dead; in his compassion for men God has died.’” (Nietzsche 1961: 69; II, Of the Compassionate) Nietzsche – or rather his alter ego Zarathustra – is exaggerating here, but he is also skilfully playing with a weak point of theism: a compassionate God is vulnerable.

A particular question is that of creation. The intention to create something can already be understood as a sign of imperfection. The Neoplatonist Plotinus, who assumes a non-personal and only negatively definable perfect deity, therefore rejects intention as a reason for creation:

Not because it [the One, the Deity] felt any need to become the world. Need would be a sign of lack; however, nothing can be lacking for the One which is perfect in itself. Nor can the origin of the world be the love of God [...]; for even in love, which Plotinus interprets as longing, there is a feeling of not having, of lack. (Weischedel 1980: 87)

A completely disinterested God would, in turn, lose all personhood.

5 Belief in the impossible

If God’s existence is a priori impossible, then he is actually inconceivable; just as, for example, no married bachelor is conceivable. How is it possible that a person is nevertheless convinced of his existence? There are three possible answers to this, all of which are probably true.

Firstly, there are several images of God, each of which is consistent in itself and alternates depending on the situation. For example, God could be understandable in everyday religious use, but in view of the theodicy problem, another concept of God, another image of God could be used. Through situational application, the contradictory images of God are never thought of simultaneously. Thereby, it can be denied that no unified image of God can result from them. Writings such as William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience (James 1977) show the diversity of the functions of belief in God.

Secondly, the concept of God is not thought of clearly at all. While some may claim that they know exactly what they mean when they speak of “God”, the efforts of philosophers such as Nicholas of Cusa (cf. Lutz 1989: 573 f., Weischedel 1980: 131) show that the concept of God is extremely obscure. In the cognitive fog, the contradiction remains invisible.

Thirdly, it is possible that people generally do not believe in God in the strict sense, i.e. in the way they believe in tangible, visible things when these are not tangible or visible at the moment. The philosopher Daniel Dennett calls this phenomenon “belief in belief” (Dennett 2016: 248): “What is commonly called ‘religious faith’ or ‘religious belief’ might less misleadingly be called ‘religious confession’. [... Perhaps] religious [confessors ...] do not understand or believe what they profess.” (Ibid.: 281) Instead, they merely believe that they should confess and believe, and eventually even believe that they believe in all that they confess (cf. ibid.: 281 f.).

As said, the contradictions within the concept of God can be explained historically by an increasing spiritualisation.

6 Conclusion

The listed contradictions are strong enough to reject the concept of God altogether. God is supposed to be both a person and something else entirely, supposed to be both open and mysterious, supposed to be manifest in nature and at the same time to have nothing to do with it, finally supposed to be deeply involved in the world and above everything. These contradictory ideas are not different doctrines of the individual religions, denominations and schools, but are all contained in the concept of God. However, there cannot be one God who unites all these contradictions in himself – that is pure logic. And yet these divine attributes are often advocated by the same person.

So, unlike the teapot in space (see chapter 2), we can already know for sure that God does not exist. So, this atheism is not: I do not believe that God exists, but: I believe (know) that God does not exist.

Philosophy requires clear concepts; it has different standards than religion (or theology). This work – as presented in chapter 1 – is by not critical of religion. Very correctly, Daniel Dennett writes:

[T]here are interesting reasons why people do not want to be committed to a particular definition of God (not even for the sake of argument). The veils of misunderstanding and failure of communication are not simply troublesome obstacles on the way to rigorous refutation; they are themselves design features of religions worthy of their own consideration. (Dennett 2016: 267 f.)

However useful this diffuseness may be for religious experience and life, it undermines philosophy’s efforts at clarity in the theism debate. The philosopher must respond to an unclear concept of God with Nietzsche’s words: “God is a coarse answer, an indelicacy against us thinkers – in fact, at bottom merely a coarse prohibition to us: you shall not think!” (Nietzsche 1990: 315; Ecce homo, Why I Am So Clever, 1) – a prohibition that is philosophically unacceptable.

This work thus refutes theism as a philosophical position.

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